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Abstract
A suitable method supported by a toolset with a high degree of automation is a necessity for the successful
employment of formal methods in industrial projects. The GTO toolset and method have been developed,
and successfully applied, to formal methods in safety-critical control applications related to railway signalling
since the mid 1990s.
The toolset and method support the entire formal methods process from writing and validating formal
speciﬁcations, through modelling of the implementation to formal veriﬁcation and analysis of veriﬁcation
results. One goal the toolset and method was to make formal methods more competitive by streamlining
the process so that – at least within an established application area – individual veriﬁcation tasks could be
done in an “assembly line”-like fashion with minimum overhead.
In line with this goal, the toolset is intended for use with conﬁgurable systems, where a generic speciﬁcation
is applicable to a family of systems and adapted to a speciﬁc system using conﬁguration data.
The functions carried out by the toolset include static checking and simulation of speciﬁcations, checking
of conﬁguration data, generation of implementation models from PLC program code or relay schematics,
simulation of the implementation model, formal veriﬁcation by reﬁnement proof, and analysis of failed
reﬁnement proofs. Reﬁnement proofs are automatically carried out by a satisﬁability (SAT) solver of the
user’s choice, which is interfaced to the main tool.
We will outline the method and functions of the toolset as well as the formal notation – a simple temporal
predicate logic – used by the toolset.
Keywords: Formal methods process, Formal methods tools, Formal veriﬁcation, Generic speciﬁcation,
Reﬁnement proof
1 Introduction and background
Formal methods are increasingly making their way into development and quality
assessment of safety-critical systems. In particular, the development during the last
decade of very fast propositional satisﬁability (SAT) solvers has made automatic
veriﬁcation of real-size industrial systems possible.
For the past 10 years the consultancy Industrilogik developed and used a toolset
and method for formal veriﬁcation of control systems – in particular for railway sig-
1 This work was done while the author was at Industrilogik L4i AB (in 2005 acquired by Prover Technology
AB). I wish to thank my former colleagues for their involvement.
2 Email: lhe@it.uu.se
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nalling. Early projects, while technically successful, required much project-speciﬁc
work by formal methods experts – they had an experimental character with high
cost. One explicit goal of the company was to verify new systems in an “assembly-
line” fashion with minimum overhead – a goal which has been realised to a major
extent. The success is the result of several factors:
• The adoption of an established and well-founded theoretical basis –– synchronous
modelling [1] and linear time temporal logic [4].
• A simple formal notation that is easy to paraphrase in natural language when
communicating with clients and application experts.
• The development of formal speciﬁcations which are generic, i.e. formulated in
general terms and not by reference to any particular system. An example is
a speciﬁcation describing general railway signalling principles rather than the
requirements of a particular installation. Using generic speciﬁcations, the speci-
ﬁcation work can for the most part be reused from one veriﬁcation project to the
next within the same application area.
• Tools which permit largely automatic translation of the implementation from
common description formats into the notation used by the veriﬁer.
• A veriﬁcation tool which interfaces to any state-of-the-art SAT solver and permits
the user to analyse the results (counter-examples) of failed veriﬁcations in terms
of concepts used in the speciﬁcation.
• The development of methods and strategies for the application area.
Here I will give an overview of the method, notation and toolset –– in particular
the veriﬁcation tool GTO 3 . While most techniques used in and together with the
tool are well established today, the particular combination was innovative when
GTO was developed and has proven successful in many industrial projects. Notable
projects include the analysis of the signalling system involved in the A˚sta railway
collision in Norway in 2000 [5] and the ALISTER interlocking development for the
Swedish National Rail Administration.
The initial inspiration for the GTO tool was the experimental modelling tool
“Delphi” developed by Ericsson (the telecom company) together with Prover Tech-
nology AB 4 in the early 1990s. The tool used a graphical modelling notation com-
bined with predicate logic and an event-based method for describing state changes
as truth maintenance problems which was innovative but computationally com-
plex. The models were analysed by the St˚almarck SAT solver [12], after translating
them into propositional logic by ﬁxing the sizes and contents of the involved sets.
In many ways the objectives and ideas behind this modelling tool were similar to
those behind the Alloy tool [10].
GTO was a complete re-implementation in Prolog done by the author at Indus-
trilogik L4i AB, shifting the focus from modelling to veriﬁcation. The basic idea of
3 Named after the Ferrari GTO racing car. A remark about an early version of the tool was that like the
car, it can take you places quickly, but you must be skilled to handle it.
4 At the time called Logikkonsult NP AB.
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having a predicate logic notation which was translated into propositional logic was
kept, but the truth maintenance function was discarded. The event notion of state
change was later replaced by a proper (albeit simple) temporal logic. Also, the tool
was made independent of any particular SAT solver by introducing a general inter-
face. The tool has been used with HeerHugo [7], Sato [14], Z-Chaﬀ [11], Limmat
[2] and a further development of the St˚almarck solver, the Prover CL-Tool. There
is also an experimental interface to the NuSMV symbolic model checker [3].
Symbolic model checkers are extensively used today used to solve veriﬁcation
problems. However our experience is that SAT solving appears to work much better
than model checking for the class of problems encountered in railway signalling.
Reports of the use of model checkers in this domain [9] as well as comparative
experiments we have made support this impression.
2 Overview
This section gives an overview of the notation, tools and method. They are illus-
trated by a complete example in section 3.
2.1 Basic Principles
The method is based on modelling of speciﬁcations and implementations in a no-
tation based on temporal logic. States of the implementation and its interfaces to
the environment are represented by truth values of predicates which can change
over time, so the behaviour of the system is described by a sequence of truth value
assignments. The concept of time is discrete and linear. Following the synchronous
hypothesis [1], the system is assumed to change state faster than its environment,
so actions can be assumed to be instantaneous and the time steps inﬁnitesimally
short.
As the requirements speciﬁcation model determines the permissible behaviour
of the system, while the implementation model determines the possible behaviours
of the system, a correct implementation must be a reﬁnement of the speciﬁcation.
The reﬁnement relation is established by showing that the invariant formulae of the
speciﬁcation model are logical consequences of (i.e. can be proved from) the imple-
mentation model formulae (together with any deﬁnition formulae of the speciﬁcation
model).
2.2 Notation
The formal notation of GTO is a variant of LTL (linear time logic)[4], using past-
time modalities. The logic is extended to include many-sorted predicate logic, i.e.
quantiﬁed formulae with diﬀerent quantiﬁcation domains and predicates. There
are several restrictions to the logic intended to make the implementation simpler
and more eﬃcient. In particular, all sorts must be ﬁnite (the values of each sort
explicitely enumerated), there is only one temporal operator (a previous moment
operator) and the function symbols of predicate logic are not allowed – only constant
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symbols are. Furthermore the previous moment operator may not be nested.
The syntax and semantics of formulae is quite standard. & is used for conjunc-
tion, # for disjunction, ~ for negation, -> for implication and <-> for equivalence.
The keywords ALL, SOME and PRE are used for universal quantiﬁcation, existential
quantiﬁcation and the previous-moment operator, respectively. There also relational
operators = and <> for equality and inequality.
As the notation uses past-time modalities, the truth value of a formula at a
particular moment of time depends only on the ﬁnite number of moments from the
initial moment.
A GTO model ﬁle is made up of a number of declaration statements. There are
statements that
• Declare types (or “sorts”).
• Declare types of constants, variables and predicates.
• Declare what predicates represent input or output.
• Deﬁne predicates in terms of formulae.
• Deﬁne predicates in terms of their true instances.
• Declare invariant formulae (or axioms).
• Include sub-models (ﬁles).
An invariant statement takes the form of a single formula. Such formulae are taken
as axioms – i.e. to be true at every moment of time. A predicate deﬁnition statement
has the form p(x1, . . . , xn)==formula. A deﬁnition formula is restricted in that it
may not depend on p at the same moment of time. From a logical point of view it can
be understood as an axiom stating the equivalence between the deﬁned predicate
and its deﬁning formula, but it also has an operational signiﬁcance for simulation
(see section 2.3.2).
The other statements will be explained informally in section 3.
2.3 Tools
The toolset includes the principal formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation tool GTO,
as well as auxiliary tools to translate from other formalisms into the GTO notation
and to check models for logical equivalence.
The basic user interface of GTO is line-oriented. The user enters text commands
and the response is likewise given as text. There is also a simple graphic user
interface. All examples in this paper will use the line-oriented user interface.
The GTO tool has a notion of state, which is a truth value assignment to predi-
cates at a particular moment of time (referred to as the “present time”) and at the
moment preceding the present time. As the previous moment operator may not be
nested, it is suﬃcient to keep the truth value assignment one moment back in time
in order to determine the truth values of formulae.
The GTO tool carries out three basic functions:
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2.3.1 Static analysis
After reading a model, GTO performs a static analysis, including type-checking the
model and checking that proper declarations and deﬁnitions are made.
GTO also ﬁnds any deﬁned predicates where the deﬁnitions do not depend on
any previous moments of time or on input predicates. The truth value assignment
for such predicates are independent of the moment of time and is computed once and
for all. The tool also checks that invariants which do not depend on any previous
moments of time or input predicates hold.
2.3.2 Simulation
Simulation is a function where the tool incrementally constructs a sequence of states
consistent with the model. The simulation feature is made possible by the choice of
past-time temporalities rather than the usual future-time ones. When every formula
depends only on past moments of time, the tool can determine the truth values of
predicate instances at successive moments in time using only information about
truth values from the previous moments. That is, a “time line” (or path) of truth
assignments can be incrementally constructed, moment for moment.
At every simulation step, the state of the tool is updated so that the present-time
truth assignment becomes the past-time truth assignment and a new present-time
truth assignment is computed according to a computation rule for every predicate.
Essentially, the tool becomes an interpreter for a synchronous dataﬂow programming
language such as Lustre [8].
The computation rules are primarily given by the predicate deﬁnitions. The
values of instances of deﬁned predicates are computed from the values of their
deﬁning formulae. As the deﬁnition of a predicate may not depend on the value of
the predicate itself at the same moment of time, it is always possible to compute it
given the truth values of the previous moment and truth values of other predicates
at the present moment.
The computation rule for predicates representing input from the environment is
that they keep the same value from the previous moment to the next unless modiﬁed
by the user in connection with the simulation step.
If some predicate p is neither deﬁned nor declared as input, GTO attempts to
obtain a computation rule by automatically constructing a deﬁnition for the predi-
cate. The deﬁnition is constructed from some invariant(s) involving the predicate so
that it will always satisfy the invariant(s). If there are invariants ALL x1. . . ALL xn
(p(x1,. . . ,xn)<->. . . ) (or similar equivalences with p to the right), GTO will pick
an arbitrary one and turn it into a deﬁnition p(x1,. . . ,xn)==. . . . Otherwise, if
there are implications ALL x1. . . ALL xn (p(x1,. . . ,xn)->. . . ), GTO will combine
them all into one and strengthen it to an equivalence, e.g. from ALL x(p(x)->q(x))
and ALL x(p(x)->r(x)), the deﬁnition p(x)==q(x)&r(x) would be constructed. If
none of these cases are applicable, GTO will look for implication invariants with p
to the right of the implication and process them similarly.
This procedure is called “completion” as it attempts to provide a complete set
of computation rules for the predicates. If some undeﬁned, non-input predicate can
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not be completed, then the model can not be simulated.
2.3.3 Proof
GTO can carry out an automatic proof of a formula F from the current model, i.e.
determine if F is a logical consequence of the set of axioms and deﬁnitions. The
notion of “logical consequence” is that for every sequence of moments of time – a
path in the terminology of linear time logic –– such that the axioms are true at
every moment, F should also be true at every moment.
The proof is done by translating the model and F into propositional logic. As
quantiﬁcation is over ﬁnite sets, such a translation is always possible. References to
predicates at the previous moment of time are considered to be references to diﬀerent
distinct predicates. The restriction on nesting the previous moment operator ensures
that there will be at most one such “previous-moment” version of each predicate. As
there is no connection with a particular moment, the eﬀect is an implicit universal
quantiﬁcation over all moments.
The resulting proof problem involving the translated formulae is sent to the
separate SAT solver. If the proof fails, the SAT solver produces a counterexample
which is read back into GTO and used to set its state. This state can then be
examined by the user to ﬁnd the reason why the proof failed.
However, the proof problem as solved by GTO does not correspond exactly to
the notion of logical consequence as deﬁned above. The SAT solver checks one
arbitrary, but singular, moment of time. There is no assurance that there is an
actual path from the initial moment of time in which the axioms hold at every
moment. In other words, a proof may fail because F is false in a state where the
axioms are all true, but the state is not on any path where the axioms are true at
each previous moment – an unreachable state. The consequence is that the proof
method is sound but incomplete.
To obtain a complete proof method, the user of GTO must employ a technique
which is essentially mathematical induction, using separate base case and induction
step proofs. In the base case, F is proved assuming a formula I, which characterises
the initial state(s) of the system. In the induction step case, F is proved assuming
that it holds at the previous moment of time. In this way, unreachable states will
be excluded from the analysis.
Just as the case is with ordinary mathematical induction, it can happen that
the formula to prove is not strong enough to serve as induction hypothesis in the
step case. In that case, a stronger formula must be proved by induction and the
requirement formula shown to follow from it by separate proof.
2.4 Method
The steps and information ﬂow of the method is outlined in ﬁgure 1. These steps
are illustrated in section 3 below.
The speciﬁcation model is developed from informal requirements or by transla-
tion from other formal notations. An important part of the method is the devel-




























Fig. 1. Information ﬂow in the GTO method
opment of a formal theory of the application domain to facilitate developing and
using generic speciﬁcation models. A description of this is outside the scope of this
paper – the interested reader is referred to [6].
As part of the validation of the speciﬁcation model it can be analysed by the
GTO tool by simulation or by proving that it has some desired correctness proper-
ties. If the speciﬁcation is written as a generic speciﬁcation, conﬁguration data must
be added to specialise the speciﬁcation for a particular system a before it can be
analysed. In particular, quantiﬁcation can only be done over ﬁnite sets of objects,
so those sets must be deﬁned. Typically the analysis is done for several diﬀerent
conﬁgurations. Analysis of the speciﬁcation in the general case must be done by a
diﬀerent tool which can handle undetermined sets, e.g. Isabelle or PVS 5 .
The implementation model is obtained from a description of the implementation
by some kind of translation procedure. The GTO toolset includes two auxiliary tools
to carry out this translation automatically for two common cases, that of a PLC
(programmable logic controller) program written in the STEP 5 language or that
of a relay circuit schematic.
The relay circuit translator is important as the major application of the GTO
5 The veriﬁcation system PVS has been used to prove general correctness properties about GTO speciﬁca-
tion models.
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toolset has so far been railway signalling. Relay implementations are still common in
this domain – new relay systems are even being commissioned today. The translator
takes as input a textual description of the connections in the relay circuit. It
uses a graph-rewriting technique where individual translation steps are done by
rewriting the graph representing the relay circuit. By changing the rewrite rules,
the translator can be adapted to diﬀerent kinds of circuit principles which may
require diﬀerent translation strategies.
There have also been promising attempts to automatically interpret CAD (Com-
puter Aided Design) drawings of relay circuits, eliminating the very tedious and
error-prone manual step of creating a textual description.
As the speciﬁcation is generic, the representation of the state of the environment
of the system will generally be diﬀerent between the speciﬁcation and implementa-
tion models. Before verifying the implementation model, the diﬀerent representa-
tions must be related using correspondence axioms.
With the speciﬁcation and implementation models, conﬁguration data, and cor-
respondence axioms available, formal veriﬁcation can be attempted.
More often than not, a proof fails because the implementation does not quite
follow the speciﬁcation. Apart from genuine errors in the implementation (or the
modelling!), the reason can be that the speciﬁcation actually restricts behaviour
more than necessary. This is not unusual when the formal veriﬁcation is done
separately from the development of the implementation.
When the proof of a requirement fails, the tool will automatically create a “coun-
terexample” state representing a situation where the system exhibits a behaviour
not allowed by the speciﬁcation. By itself the counterexample is of limited use,
partly because of its excruciating detail, but also because it does not explain the
reason for the incorrect behaviour. Most of the information described in the coun-
terexample is coincidental to the particular requirement being violated. E.g. the
counterexample will include state information of parts of the implementation not
related to the failing function.
An important step of the method is the analysis of a counterexample state to
provide a characterisation of the situations where the system exhibits an erroneous
behaviour. This analysis is presently carried out by hand and requires a substantial
understanding of how the veriﬁed system works. The result of this analysis is used
as output from the veriﬁcation process to describe a particular problem with the
veriﬁed system.
The characterisation is also used to ﬁnd other situations where the same (or
other) requirement is violated. The theorem proving attempt is repeated with the
assumption that the recently characterised error situation can not occur. This will
cause the theorem prover to disregard that particular situation and it will either
report that the proof succeeded (in which case all errors have been found), or it will
generate a counterexample for a diﬀerent error situation which can in its turn be
analysed. By successively analysing counterexamples and retrying the proof in this
manner, all ways in which the system violates the requirement will eventually be
found.
L.-H. Eriksson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 77–9184
2.5 Reliability issues
The results of formal veriﬁcation is typically used as evidence of the correctness of
the implementation, e.g. in the safety case of a safety-critical system. This raises
the issue of the validity of the evidence itself. How can we rely on the formal
veriﬁcation to produce correct results?
In the case of GTO this issue has been addressed when necessary by a combina-
tion of diversity, and of formal veriﬁcation of the tool itself. The core functionality
of the GTO tool has been formally veriﬁed using the LPTP [13] veriﬁcation system
for Prolog programs. Diversity is introduced by independently making two models
of the implementation – repeating both any manual steps such as hand-coding of
relay circuit diagrams and in some cases even duplicating translation tools – and
comparing the results. Also, as GTO is not bound to any particular SAT solver,
the analysis can be repeated using two diﬀerent SAT solvers.
3 Example
3.1 The application
We will illustrate the method by running through a simple example. The application
is a control unit for a crane motor. The control unit has three inputs, upbutton,
downbutton and stopbutton, connected to push-buttons. It has two outputs, moveup
and movedown which control the motor. When the “up” or “down” button is
pressed, the corresponding output should be activated. The output will continue to
be activated until the “stop” button is pressed. The control unit must be designed
so that both outputs can not be activated at the same time as that will damage the
motor.
3.2 Implementation model
Suppose that the control unit is implemented according to the following pseudo-code
program:
bool upbutton,downbutton,stopbutton,moveup,movedown
moveup ← movedown ← false
repeat
input upbutton,downbutton,stopbutton
if downbutton then movedown ← true
if moveup then movedown ← false
if upbutton then moveup ← true
if movedown then moveup ← false
if stopbutton then moveup ← movedown ← false
output moveup,movedown
end repeat
A sample GTO model of the implementation above is
PRED upbutton, downbutton, stopbutton, moveup, movedown, start;
L.-H. Eriksson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 77–91 85
INPUT upbutton, downbutton, stopbutton;
OUTPUT moveup, movedown;
movedown == (downbutton# PRE movedown)&~stopbutton& PRE ~moveup;
moveup == (upbutton# PRE moveup)&~stopbutton&~movedown;
start == ~movedown & ~moveup;
The ﬁrst line of the model declares the predicates used. These predicates lack
arguments, i.e. they are propositional variables. The next two lines declare the
predicates used to represent input and output. The predicates moveup and movedown
are deﬁned by formulae representing the eﬀects of executing the loop body of the
pseudo-code program. The start predicate is used to characterise the initial state
of the system before the ﬁrst iteration of the loop, after both moveup and movedown
have been set to false.
This model can be simulated by GTO to investigate its behaviour. Text following












The simulation is initialised by the init command which sets the initial truth
values of all predicates to false. New truth values are then computed according to
the deﬁnitions. With the do command, the user asks for one time step to take place
with the input predicate upbutton set to true. This causes the output predicate
moveup to be true. The user then resets moveup to false (“releasing” the up button)
in the next step - this does not cause any changes to the output predicate values.
The user simulates a press and release of the down button. This does not have
any eﬀect as the up output is already activated. Pressing the stop button causes
moveup to become false. Now pressing the down button will make movedown true.
3.3 Speciﬁcation
We will make a formal speciﬁcation of two safety properties of the control unit –
that both outputs must not be active at the same time, and that between the times
the cancel button has been pressed and the next time a request button is pressed,
the corresponding output must not be active.
To illustrate generic speciﬁcations, we will make the requirements speciﬁcation
more general. The speciﬁcation will express the safety properties for a control unit
L.-H. Eriksson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 185 (2007) 77–9186
which can handle any number of functions, not just the “up” and “down” functions
of the sample implementation. Also, the speciﬁcation can be tailored to exclude any








ALL f (activate(f) -> ALL f1 (exclude(f,f1) -> ~activate(f1)));
cancelrequest(f) == cancel # PRE cancelrequest(f) & ~request(f);
ALL f (activate(f) -> ~cancelrequest(f));
ALL f ALL f1 (exclude(f,f1) -> exclude(f1,f));
initial == ALL f cancelrequest(f) & ~cancel & ALL f ~request(f);
The speciﬁcation begins with a declaration of the type function representing the
set of diﬀerent functions that the speciﬁed system controls. Next, the variables f
and f1 are declared to range over objects of the type function. On the following
lines, various predicates and their argument types are declared, e.g. request is a
predicate with one argument of type function.
The ﬁrst invariant states that if a function is activated, then any other function
which is excluded from being active at the same time must, in fact, be deactivated.
cancelrequest is deﬁned to be true for each function from the time the cancel
input is true until it becomes false, and the corresponding request input becomes
true. The second invariant states that an output must not be activated during the
time interval that cancelrequest is true for that function. The third invariant is
a consistency check of the exclude predicate, stating that it must be a symmetric
relation.
Note that the exclude predicate is not deﬁned, nor are constants of the type
function given. This information is provided as conﬁguration data when the spec-
iﬁcation is used with a particular implementation. E.g. in this case:
CONST up,down:function;
FACTS exclude(up,down),exclude(down,up);
The speciﬁcation is conﬁgured for use with the crane motor application by declaring
the constant symbols up and down to belong to the type function and deﬁning the
predicate excludes to be true in exactly the stated instances. When loading the
speciﬁcation into GTO, the symmetry of the exclude predicate according to the
third invariant above is checked and if there is a discrepancy, it is reported.
We now analyse the speciﬁcation model by simulation. The example speciﬁca-
tion is nondeterministic as it only describes safety properties which can be satisﬁed
in diﬀerent ways. There are no requirements on when outputs should be active,
only when they should not be. In this case, GTO can “complete” the model by
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constructing a deﬁnition for activate, making the model deterministic. The con-
structed deﬁnition is
activate(f) == ALL f1 (exclude(f,f1)-> ~activate(f1)) &
~cancelrequest(f);
This deﬁnition cases outputs will be activated when it is “maximally dangerous”
(and presumably most interesting) with respect to the speciﬁcation.
We want to start the simulation in a particular initial state where we assume
that no request inputs are active, but that the cancel input has been active. This
state is characterised by the initial predicate.
> satisfy initial











The interaction begins with the user requesting GTO to ﬁnd a state in which
initial is true, i.e. the speciﬁcation is in the initial state. The SAT solver is
called upon to ﬁnd such a state. The interaction then goes on along the same lines
as the simulation of the implementation model. Note that the completed deﬁni-
tion of the activate predicate makes GTO automatically activate the appropriate
output when allowed by the speciﬁcation.
3.4 Formal veriﬁcation
Before veriﬁcation, a composite model must be created including both implemen-
tation and speciﬁcation as well as the correspondence axioms:
USE implementation;
REFINES specification;
ALL f (request(f) <-> f=up&up_button # f=down&down_button);
ALL f (activate(f) <-> f=up&moveup # f=down&movedown);
cancel <-> stop_button;
Assuming that implementation and specification are names of ﬁles containing
the implementation and speciﬁcation models, respectively, the ﬁrst two lines state
that this composite model includes the implementation and speciﬁcation with the
purpose of reﬁning the speciﬁcation model. This has the important eﬀect of not
taking invariants in the speciﬁcation ﬁles as axioms, as they are the requirement
formulae to be proved.
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After loading the composite model, proofs of the requirement formulae can be
done. These formulae are identiﬁed by the name of the ﬁle where they occur, and
a sequence number. The following interaction shows that the ﬁrst requirement
formula of the speciﬁcation is satisﬁed by the implementation.
> prove specification_1
The formula is valid
The second requirement formula can not be directly proved. It is true only when
the system is initialised in a state where the requirement already holds. Instead, it
has to be proved by the induction proof method described in section 2.3.3. As the
system is in its initial state when the predicate start is true, the induction proof
can be done as:
> prove start -> specification_2
The formula is valid
> prove PRE specification_2 -> specification_2
The formula is valid
Now, suppose that a mistake had been made in the implementation, e.g. that the
pseudo-code statement if movedown then moveup ← false had been omitted. In
that case the deﬁnition of moveup would become
moveup == (upbutton# PRE moveup)&~stopbutton;
and the proof attempt would fail
> prove specification_1
The formula is falsifiable.
> why
Formula is FALSE because
f=up, activate(up)=>... f1=down, exclude(up,down)=>... activate(down)
> evf movedown & upbutton
TRUE
As the formula can not be proved, GTO creates a state in which it is false. Using the
why command, the user asks GTO to attempt an explanation of why the requirement
could not be proved. The tool gives instances (witnesses) for the quantiﬁed variables
for which the quantiﬁed formula is false and displays the corresponding instance of
the quantiﬁed formula. In this case with only two objects of the type function it
is obvious that each of them have to be involved, but in more complicated cases
the explanation function can be of great help. The user can also inspect the state
directly e.g. by using the evf command to evaluate a formulae in it.
After inspecting the state and implementation, the user identiﬁes the error
–– that if the crane motor is already moving down, then pushing the up button
will activate the up output. The error situation can be described by the formula
movedown&upbutton. To ﬁnd other possible problems with the implementation, the
proof is repeated with the error situation excluded by assuming the negation of its
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description:
> prove ~(movedown&upbutton) -> specification_1
The formula is valid.
The proof succeeds, so that was the only error with respect to this requirement.
4 Conclusions and future work
We have outlined the function of the GTO toolset and how it is used for formal
speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation work. The goal of automating the time-consuming
parts of the process has to a large extent been realised.
The major task which remains manual is the analysis of counter-examples from
failed proof attempts. Although it is unlikely that this process can be completely
automated, the tool could provide substantial support to the user in ﬁnding expla-
nations of why a requirement fails and in characterising the situation in which this
happens.
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